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LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY OF CARBON 
TARIFFS IN THE EU 
Steven Nathaniel Zane* 
Abstract: In the absence of any robust international agreements to com-
bat climate change, some countries undertake climate change policy uni-
laterally. One such example is the European Union’s emissions trading sys-
tem, a government program that sets the quantity of authorized carbon 
emissions in the EU. This system, however, places the EU’s energy-inten-
sive industries at a competitive disadvantage compared to foreign firms 
without similar environmental restrictions. In order to level the playing 
field, some have proposed carbon border taxes or “carbon tariffs.” This 
Note assesses the legality of these proposed carbon tariffs under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, part of the World Trade Organiza-
tion. Because such tariffs will likely violate the main text of the GATT, this 
Note examines whether Article XX exceptions may apply to permit carbon 
tariffs. The Note concludes that despite the importance of climate change 
mitigation and the recent liberalization of WTO jurisprudence, Article XX 
should not be interpreted so broadly as to permit the introduction of car-
bon tariffs in the EU. 
Introduction 
 Climate change is a natural phenomenon, but most scientists now 
agree that human behavior has exacerbated this natural process.1 More 
specifically, carbon dioxide emissions from human activities have rap-
idly accelerated the “greenhouse effect” where greenhouse gases trap 
infrared radiation (heat energy) in the Earth’s atmosphere, contribut-
ing to an increase in the warming of the Earth’s surface.2 Studies esti-
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1 WTO Secretariat & United Nations Env’t Programme, Trade and Climate Change, 3, 
(2009) (prepared by Ludivine Tamiotti et al.) [hereinafter WTO Report]. 
2 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review 4–5 
(2007) [hereinafter Stern Review]. Climate change is the result of all greenhouse gas 
emissions, but carbon dioxide emissions are the most significant due to the “unparalled 
quantities produced by humans each year.” Christina K. Harper, Climate Change and Tax 
Policy, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 411, 415 (2007). 
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mate that concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have 
risen more than thirty percent since pre-industrial times,3 and scientists 
predict that if emissions continue at the same rate, greenhouse gases 
will be twice pre-industrial levels by the middle of the twenty-first cen-
tury.4 Many experts insist that this would have catastrophic conse-
quences, and that there is an urgent need to reduce carbon emissions.5 
 In response to climate change, the European Union (EU) has 
adopted an emissions trading scheme in which total carbon emissions 
in the EU are capped, and the EU distributes allowance permits to be 
traded among producers.6 Although this regional emissions agreement 
may be a major step toward reducing global carbon emissions, energy-
intensive industries in the EU have expressed concern over competi-
tiveness with energy-intensive industries outside the EU.7 Additionally, 
this asymmetry between EU and non-EU industries may create a phe-
nomenon referred to as “carbon leakage.”8 Accordingly, a debate has 
emerged in the EU over possible border measures to address these per-
ceived problems.9 Although EU commissioners remain skeptical, 
France has insisted upon border taxes related to carbon emissions for 
several years.10 In the wake of a largely unsuccessful climate convention 
in Copenhagen, the debate over carbon border taxes may reemerge in 
the EU with a new sense of urgency.11 
                                                                                                                      
 
3 WTO Report, supra note 1, at 3. 
4 Stern Review, supra note 2, at 15. Admittedly, the Stern Report is viewed by some as 
“controversial” or alarmist. See Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. 
Interests, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1531, 1595 (2009). 
5 Stern Review, supra note 2, at 21; Harper, supra note 2, at 412. The phrase “climate 
change” has generally replaced “global warming” because the issue is not simply a rise in 
temperature, but also (and perhaps more importantly) actual changes in the global cli-
mate system. See Harper, supra note 2, at 412–13. As a recent WTO report notes, “[i]t is 
reasonable to argue that climate change will be experienced most directly through 
changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. Such weather events are 
‘hidden’ in the changes in climatic averages and have immediate short-term implications 
for well-being and daily livelihoods.” WTO Report, supra note 1, at 13. 
6 WTO Report, supra note 1, at 91. 
7 See Harro van Asselt & Frank Biermann, European Emissions Trading and the Interna-
tional Competitiveness of Energy-Intensive Industries: A Legal and Political Evaluation of Possible 
Supporting Measures, 35 Energy Pol’y 497, 498 (2007). 
8 See Secretary General of the Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Climate Change Miti-
gation: What Do We Do?, 23 (Nov. 27, 2008) [hereinafter OECD Report]. 
9 See Asselt & Biermann, supra note 7, at 498. 
10 See France Wants EU Carbon Tax on Imports from Nations Without Strict Emissions Limits, 
(BNA) (31 Int’l Env’t Rep.) 983 (Oct. 10, 2008). 
11 See Francesco Sindico, The EU and Carbon Leakage: How to Reconcile Border Adjustments 
with the WTO?, 17 European Energy & Envtl. L. Rev. 328, 333 (2008); U.N. Officials Say 
Climate Change Process ‘Taking Stock’ After Copenhagen Summit, (BNA) (33 Int’l Env’t Rep.) 85 
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 This Note explores the possibility of an EU-wide carbon border tax. 
Part I addresses the economics of climate change, and explains the EU 
response. It then explains carbon border tax adjustments and the EU’s 
position on using such adjustments to eliminate the artificial advantage 
for non-EU industries that do not have similar environmental restric-
tions. Part II examines the international legality of carbon border taxes 
under World Trade Organization (WTO) law, and discusses whether 
carbon border taxes might fit into an environmental exception under 
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Part III analyzes the recent evolution of Article XX in WTO jurispru-
dence. As a result of this analysis, Part III suggests that carbon tariffs in 
the EU should fail the Article XX analysis for reasons that illustrate sig-
nificant concerns with the recent liberalization of WTO jurisprudence. 
Despite a generally favorable response to this development in WTO ju-
risprudence, climate change mitigation presents a novel policy that 
demonstrates the inherent limitations of Article XX. 
I. Background 
A. Climate Change and the EU’s Collective Response 
 In economic terms, climate change attributed to carbon emissions 
is a “negative externality.”12 A negative externality is a cost of economic 
activity that is not internalized to the economic activity itself.13As such, 
negative externalities are costs imposed on third parties without market 
correction.14 As a result, they are generally treated as phenomena that 
policymakers must correct.15 Climate change represents a global nega-
tive externality because it involves the “global environmental com-
mons.”16 Unregulated exploitation of the global environment by indi-
vidual countries may create a “tragedy of the commons” in which every 
individual country has an incentive to exploit resources in the short 
                                                                                                                      
(Jan. 1, 2010) (noting that the Copenhagen Summit did not produce any international 
climate change mitigation agreement as was expected). 
12 WTO Report, supra note 1, at 88. 
13 Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International 
Trade 509 (3d ed. 2005). A simple example would be pollution that spills over from the 
productive activities of one country to the territory of another country. See id. 
14 Stern Review, supra note 2, at 27. 
15 See id. Stern refers to climate change due to human carbon emissions as a “market 
failure on the greatest scale the world has seen.” Id. 
16 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 13, at 509. 
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term without investing in long-term preservation.17 The most logical 
solution to this problem is international collective action.18 
 The most significant and well-known global response to climate 
change is the Kyoto Protocol.19 The Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 
and requires industrialized countries to reduce emissions over an initial 
commitment period from 2008--2012.20 Although the United States re-
fused to ratify the Protocol, it came into force with Russia’s ratification 
in November 2004.21 
 In 2003, to comply with Kyoto’s goals, the EU created the “largest 
emissions trading scheme ever implemented.”22 An emissions trading 
scheme (ETS) represents a government program that sets the quantity 
of authorized emissions and distributes permits accordingly, allowing 
the market to determine the price of carbon emissions.23 The EU ETS 
began on January 1, 2005, with a mandatory “warm-up” phase from 
2005--2007, and a second mandatory phase from 2008--2012 that corre-
sponds to the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period.24 As of 2009, 
the EU ETS covered “more than 10,000 installations in the energy and 
industrial sectors that are collectively responsible for about half of the 
EU’s emissions of CO2.”25 
B. Leveling the Playing Field: Carbon Border Taxes in the EU? 
 The EU’s domestic regulation of carbon emissions through an ETS 
has provoked serious debate about the international competitiveness of 
energy-intensive industries within the EU.26 The EU ETS represents a 
                                                                                                                      
17 Stern Review, supra note 2, at 512. 
18 See id. at 510–11. 
19 See Will Gerber, Note, Defining “Developing Country” in the Second Commitment Period of 
the Kyoto Protocol, 31 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 327, 329 (2008). 
20 WTO Report, supra note 1, at 68. Countries considered “developed” are included in 
“Annex B,” and the goal of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
Annex B countries to five percent below 1990 levels during the first commitment period. 
Sikina Jinnah, Note, Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol: NAFTA and WTO Concerns, 15 
Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 709, 714 (2003). 
21 Harper, supra note 2, at 417. 
22 Council Directive 2003/87, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 34 (EC); Javier de Cendra, 
Can Emissions Trading Schemes Be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments?: An Analysis vis-à-vis 
WTO Law, 15 Rev. European Community & Envtl. L. 131, 132 (2006). 
23 See WTO Report, supra note 1, at 91–92. 
24 Asselt & Biermann, supra note 7, at 497–98. 
25 WTO Report, supra note 1, at 91. 
26 See Asselt & Biermann, supra note 7, at 498; see also Sindico, supra note 11, at 329 
(noting that “certain sectors of European industry are seriously taking into consideration 
relocation as a business strategy”). 
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domestic program addressing a global negative externality.27 As such, 
the possibility of inequity arises because other countries with which the 
EU engages in commerce do not have similar programs in place.28 Ac-
cordingly, two major problems emerge.29 The first is the competitiveness 
of energy-intensive industries in the EU vis-à-vis competing industries in 
jurisdictions without similar environmental restrictions.30 Normally, a 
foreign producer that operates at lower costs is simply more competitive 
and should, under free trade principles, be able to out-compete its do-
mestic rival.31 But when lower costs result from the lack of environ-
mental costs, the advantage is artificial.32 Because the foreign producer 
is not subject to environmental restrictions and continues to emit car-
bon into the global commons, the foreign producer unfairly benefits 
from the efforts of domestic industry.33 This creates an “unequal playing 
field” in international trade within the energy-intensive sector of the 
global economy.34 
 The second potential problem is “carbon leakage,” which means 
that any domestic carbon reduction would be offset in the global envi-
ronmental commons by an increase in carbon emissions elsewhere.35 
Unlike the first concern, which is essentially one of fairness, carbon 
leakage involves the effectiveness of environmental regulations.36 For-
eign firms without environmental costs may be more competitive and 
produce higher emissions than they otherwise would, thereby offsetting 
some or all of the emissions reductions made by the domestic indus-
try.37 Further, regulatory asymmetry may create “carbon havens” where 
industries relocate to benefit from lower environmental standards, 
which may accelerate the offsetting envisaged above.38 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Stern Review, supra note 2, at 27. 
28 See Asselt & Biermann, supra note 7, at 498. 
29 See Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 12, at 511. 
30 See id. 
31 See Tania Voon, Sizing Up the WTO: Trade-Environment Conflict and the Kyoto Protocol, 10 
J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 71, 74 (2000) (“The theory of comparative advantage suggests 
that countries should specialize in producing those goods and services that they can pro-
duce most efficiently.”). 
32 See Matthew Tuchband, Note, The Systematic Environmental Externalities of Free Trade: A 
Call for Wiser Decision Making, 83 Geo. L. J. 2099, 2103–05(1995). 
33 See Asselt & Biermann, supra note 7, at 498. 
34 See id. 
35 See OECD Report, supra note 8, at 23. 
36 See WTO Report, supra note 1, at 98. 
37 See OECD Report, supra note 8, at 23. 
38 See WTO Report, supra note 1, at 99. 
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 Border tax adjustments are one of the most straightforward me-
chanisms by which the EU could attempt to level the playing field and 
reduce carbon leakage.39 The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s (OECD) 1970 Working Party on Border Tax Ad-
justments defined a border tax adjustment as “any fiscal measures 
which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination principle,” 
where the destination principle enables products to be taxed at the 
same rates in the importing and exporting countries.40 In other words, 
a border tax adjustment consists of either a charge on imports corre-
sponding to a tax borne domestically or a tax exemption on exports.41 
The potential policy mechanism by which the EU could level the play-
ing field and reduce carbon leakage is a border tax on imports from 
foreign energy-intensive industries: colloquially, a “carbon tariff.”42 
 There has been discussion regarding a possible carbon tariff since 
the inception of the EU ETS.43 In 2008, former EU Trade Commis-
sioner Peter Mandelson remarked that a carbon border tax was the 
“elephant in the room” amid discussions of international trade incen-
tives related to climate change programs.44 Since 2007, French Presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy has insisted upon some form of compensation 
mechanism for EU energy-intensive industries,45 and in 2009 he ex-
pressed interest in an EU-wide carbon border tax as part of the Copen-
hagen summit.46 Moreover, although the German State Secretary for 
                                                                                                                      
39 See Asselt & Biermann, supra note 7, at 502. 
40 Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, Border Tax Adjustments, para. 4, L/3464 
(Dec. 2, 1970), GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 97, 98 (1972) [hereinafter Working Party]. 
The destination principle, developed by 19th century economist David Ricardo, states that 
taxes should only be levied in the country of consumption. See Paul Demaret & Paul Stew-
ardson, Border Tax Adjustments Under GATT and EC Law and General Implications for Environ-
mental Taxes, J. World Trade, Aug. 1994, at 5, 6. 
41 Working Party, supra note 40. Although border tax adjustments may involve imports 
or exports, this Note focuses on imports only. Notably, relieving domestic energy-intensive 
industries from regulations through export BTAs would completely defeat the environmen-
talist purpose of domestic regulations. See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green 
Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 Cornell Int’l L. J. 459, 500 (1994). 
42 See Paul-Erik Veel, Carbon Tariffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of Feasible Policies, 12 J. 
Int’l Econ. L. 749, 749–50 (2009). 
43 See EU Commission Rejects Demand for Tariffs on Countries Not Ratifying Kyoto Protocol, 
(BNA)(27 Int’l Env’t Rep.) 545 ( July 14, 2004) (claiming that “[t]he European Commis-
sion rejected demands by the European Union Green Party that it consider imposing tar-
iffs on ‘free riding’ industrialized countries”). 
44 EU Official Says Carbon Tax Premature, Could Alienate Countries, Violate WTO Rules, 
(BNA)(31 Int’l Env’t Rep.) 884 (Oct. 1, 2008). 
45 France Wants EU Carbon Tax, supra note 10, at 983. 
46 Sophie Borenstein, Discussions for Framework for Carbon Tax Underway, 55 Tax Notes 
Int’l 276, 277 (2009). 
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the Environment referred to carbon tariffs as “eco-imperialism,”47 
Germany recently reversed its position and joined France in support of 
an EU carbon border tax.48 Still, many within the EU have remained 
skeptical of border taxes on carbon emissions.49 The European Com-
mission has insisted that a carbon border tax should be considered only 
as a last resort.50 
 In the wake of a largely unproductive Copenhagen summit, the 
serious possibility of an EU-wide carbon tariff may reemerge.51 In light 
of this possibility, the overarching question arises as to whether a bor-
der tax for carbon emissions—a carbon tariff—would be legal under 
prevailing international trade law: the WTO.52 
II. Discussion 
A. Are Carbon Tariffs Eligible for Border Tax Adjustment? 
 Although the economic efficiency and administrative feasibility of 
carbon tariffs are subjects worthy of debate, the overarching issue is 
legal: would such tariffs comply with international trade law?53 In 1947, 
                                                                                                                      
47 Cf. Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth 
of Illegality, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 59, 62–63 (2002) (“[T]he rich country may be viewed as 
trying to coerce the poor country into placing a higher value on the environment than the 
poor country considers appropriate.”). 
48 Charles Gnaedinger, Germany and France: Allies on Carbon Border Tax, 55 Tax Notes 
Int’l 1104, 1104 (2009). 
49 See Kristen A. Parillo, EU Commissioner Criticizes Carbon Border Tax, 56 Tax Notes 
Int’l 234, 234 (2009) (noting the reservations of EU Environment Commissioner Stavros 
Dimas to an EU carbon border tax); France to Push EU Members States to Embrace Carbon Bor-
der Taxes, (BNA) (WTO Rep.) ( June 17, 2009) (noting that former EU Trade Commis-
sioner Peter Mandelson said that a carbon border tax would likely alienate countries, in-
vite retaliation, and run the risk of violating WTO law); OECD Chief Warns Green-Conscious 
Nations Not to Apply Carbon Levies via Border Taxes, (BNA) (WTO Rep.) (Aug. 28, 2009) (not-
ing that the Secretary General of the OECD, Angel Gurria, discouraged countries from 
applying border taxes related to climate change). 
50 See France, Germany Aiming to Propose ‘Carbon’ Leakage Tax, Sarkozy Says, (BNA) (WTO 
Rep.) (Sept. 21, 2009); see also Parillo, supra note 49, at 235 (quoting EU Environment 
Commissioner Stavros Dimas as stating, “I believe, fully in line with the longstanding EU 
position on this, that the best way to avoid carbon leakage and address competitiveness 
concerns is to agree on an ambitious and comprehensive climate change deal in Copen-
hagen”). 
51 See Sindico, supra note 11, at 333; U.N. Officials Say Climate Change Process ‘Taking 
Stock’ After Copenhagen Summit, supra note 11, at 85. 
52 See Veel, supra note 42, at 770. 
53 See id. 
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twenty-three major trading countries formed the GATT54 as a provi-
sional agreement in the wake of World War II.55 Nevertheless, it has 
remained the “permanent institutional basis for the multilateral world 
trading regime” to this day.56 In 1994, the WTO replaced the GATT, 
although under the WTO agreement the GATT remains operative in-
ternational law (now referred to as “GATT 1994”).57 The GATT’s pur-
pose is to supervise trade restrictions and generally prohibit protection-
ist policies, thereby promoting competition.58 The international legality 
of a trade-restrictive measure such as carbon tariffs must be assessed 
under the provisions of the GATT.59 
 Border tax adjustments are legal under the GATT in limited cir-
cumstances for internal taxes.60 Article II:2(a) governs the legality of 
customs charges unless the charge (tariff) is an adjustment for an inter-
nal tax.61 For such adjustments, Article III for internal taxes applies.62 
There is no precedent, however, for whether an ETS like the EU’s 
could qualify as an internal tax.63 The term “tax” is not defined in the 
WTO agreement’s analytical index, and some authors suggest that the 
OECD’s definition should be used.64 Under this definition, a tax is a 
“compulsory contribution imposed by the government for which tax-
payers receive nothing identifiable in return for their contribution.”65 
Several authors argue that although an ETS is not technically an inter-
nal tax, a border tax adjustment could likely still be employed as long as 
permits were auctioned rather than freely distributed: this would create 
                                                                                                                      
54 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. parts A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT]. 
55 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 13, at 23. 
56 Id. 
57 See Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1144, 
1145 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
58 See Charnovitz, supra note 41, at 485, 524–25. 
59 See Asselt & Biermann, supra note 7, at 499. 
60 See Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, pa-
ra. 5.2.3, L/6175 ( June 17, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136, 160 (1988) [herein-
after Superfund Panel Report]. 
61 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment:The 
Continuing Search for Conciliation, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 268, 306 (1997). The Article III non-
discrimination principle is essential for implementing the schedules of concessions for 
lowered bound tariffs contained in Article II. See id. at 271. 
62 See id. at 306. 
63 See WTO Report, supra note 1, at 100–01. 
64 See, e.g., Cendra, supra note 22, at 135. 
65 See Roland Ismer & Karen Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustments: A Feasible Way to Address 
Nonparticipation in Emission Trading 11 (Cambridge-MIT Inst., Working Paper No. 
36)(2004). 
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a charge on domestic producers that could be adjusted at the border 
via carbon tariff.66 Notably, however, the EU ETS originally distributed 
most permits for free.67 
 Nevertheless, if the permit allowance system under the EU ETS is 
characterized as an internal tax for purposes of the GATT, the question 
is whether this “tax” on carbon emissions qualifies for border tax ad-
justment.68 The basic distinction, first promulgated by the GATT Work-
ing Party on Border Tax Adjustments in 1970, is between direct and 
indirect taxes.69 Direct taxes are taxes on producers rather than prod-
ucts, and do not qualify for border tax adjustment.70 Indirect taxes, on 
the other hand, are taxes on products rather than producers, and qual-
ify for border tax adjustment.71 Under the destination principle all 
products should be taxed in the country of consumption.72 Thus, the 
traditional rationale for the distinction is that product taxes will be 
passed forward to consumers while producer taxes will not.73 
 Whether WTO and GATT case law establishes this bifurcation be-
tween product and producer taxes is somewhat controversial,74 but the 
distinction at least appears to be recognized in case law.75 Although 
there is no formal principle of stare decisis in WTO case law, there is 
practical precedent in the sense that dispute settlement bodies tend to 
follow past decisions.76 In any event, there is no precedent that answers 
                                                                                                                      
66 See, e.g., Cendra, supra note 22, at 136; see also Ismer & Neuhoff, supra note 65 (argu-
ing that “the costs of obtaining the permits should not be seen as providing such a service” 
because the beneficiary is not the producer but the “wider community”). 
67 See WTO Report, supra note 1, at 94. One author suggests that, even if distributed 
for free, the opportunity cost of selling the freely distributed permits could make an ETS 
qualify as an internal tax. See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness 
Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law 21–22 (Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. 
Policy Solutions, Working Paper No. 07–02, 2007). 
68 See WTO Report, supra note 1, at 103. 
69 Working Party, supra note 40, para. 14. The panel also referred to “taxes occultes,” 
(“hidden taxes”) for which there was a divergence of views regarding eligibility for border 
tax adjustment. See id. at para. 15. One author argues that a tax on carbon emissions best 
fits into this category because the Report specifically listed “energy taxes” as an example. 
See Veel, supra note 42, at 772. 
70 See Working Party, supra note 40, at para. 14. 
71 See id. 
72 See Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 40, at 6. 
73 See Pauwelyn, supra note 67, at 18. 
74 See Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 13, at 539–40. 
75 See, e.g., Superfund Panel Report, supra note 60, at para. 5.2.4. 
76 See Carrie Wofford, Note, A Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO Juris-
prudence on Environmental Exceptions to the GATT, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 563, 590 (2000). 
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whether border tax adjustments can be applied for domestic taxes on 
carbon emissions.77 
 The closest analogy to carbon tariffs in case law is discussed in 
United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (Super-
fund).78 The GATT Panel found that border tax adjustments could be 
applied to chemicals used in the production of imported products, and 
reasoned that domestic taxes on chemicals were product rather than 
producer taxes.79 Although some have suggested that this precedent 
paves the way for carbon border tax adjustments,80 there is a significant 
distinction: whereas the chemicals in Superfund were “physically incor-
porated” into the final products, carbon emissions are not incorporated 
into any product, but are a by-product of the production process.81 
This distinction seems to weigh heavily in favor of carbon taxes as pro-
ducer rather than product taxes.82 Indeed, most scholars agree that 
inputs must be physically incorporated into the final product to qualify 
for border tax adjustment, and that carbon tariffs would not be consid-
ered indirect taxes under Article III.83 
                                                                                                                     
  Moreover, even if carbon tariffs are considered Article III border 
tax adjustments, Article III requires that the importing country does not 
discriminate between domestic and foreign “like products.”84 The key 
issue here is whether foreign and domestic products can be distin-
guished based on the quantity of carbon emitted during the production 
process.85 If products cannot be distinguished, the tax burden on im-
ports cannot exceed that on domestic products.86 A carbon tariff will 
thus violate GATT unless production methods with different carbon 
emissions are sufficient grounds for distinguishing between domestic 
 
77 See Aaron Cosbey & Richard Tarasofsky, Climate Change, Competitiveness 
and Trade 20 (2007). 
78 See Superfund Panel Report, supra note 60, at para. 5.2.4. 
79 Id. In doing so, the Panel upheld the Working Party’s distinction. See id. 
80 See Veel, supra note 42, at 773. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. Several authors argue that the purpose of a carbon tax demonstrates that it is 
really a tax on the product rather than on the producer. See, e.g., Mary Kate Crimp, Envi-
ronmental Taxes: Can Border Tax Adjustments Be Used to Counter Any Market Disadvantage?, 12 
N.Z. J. Envtl. L. 39, 55 (2008); Pauwelyn, supra note 67, at 20–21. 
83 See Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 311; Veel, supra note 42, at 778. 
84 GATT art. 3, paras. 2, 4. 
85 See Sindico, supra note 11, at 337–38. Whether process and production methods 
(PPMs) are ever grounds for determining “like products” is the subject of much contro-
versy. See, e.g., Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction—An Illusory 
Basis for Disciplining “Unilateralism” in Trade Policy, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 249, 251–52 (2000). 
86 See Gavin Goh, The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the 
Border, J. World Trade, June 2004, at 395, 402. 
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and foreign products.87 In European Communities—Measures Affecting As-
bestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (Asbestos), the Appellate Body rea-
soned that “likeness” should be determined on a case-by-case basis, but 
involves factors such as end-use, consumer tastes, and physical proper-
ties.88 Most authors point out that, because carbon emissions are not 
incorporated into the final product, it is difficult to distinguish between 
products based solely on carbon emissions.89 Even a commentator who 
supports a more flexible characterization of the term “like product” in-
sists that “it would be a radical shift to differentiate products on the basis 
of how they are produced, manufactured, or harvested.”90 For the same 
reason that carbon taxes are probably not product taxes, they are prob-
ably not compliant with Article III’s non-discrimination rule for like 
products.91 
B. Article XX Exceptions 
 If carbon tariffs do not qualify as border tax adjustments consistent 
with Article III, Article XX provides a list of exceptions where violations 
of other GATT provisions may be permitted.92 Indeed, some commen-
tators describe Article XX as an “environmental charter” because it al-
lows trade restrictions related to protecting the environment (although 
the term “environment” is conspicuously absent).93 Article XX requires 
a two part analysis: first, whether the trade measure is provisionally jus-
tified by one of the substantive exceptions; second, whether the trade 
measure satisfies the Article’s prefatory “chapeau.”94 The treatment of 
trade measures in GATT jurisprudence changed radically after the 
WTO’s formation, and has since evolved to encompass broader policies 
                                                                                                                      
87 See Veel, supra note 42, at 780. 
88 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and As-
bestos-Containing Products, para. 101, WT/DS135/AB/R (Apr. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Asbestos 
Appellate Body Report]. 
89 See, e.g., Sindico, supra note 11, at 337–38; Veel, supra note 42, at 780–81. But see Da-
niel C. Esty, Greening the GATT 220 (1994) (“[T]he GATT must move beyond the 
existing distinction between trade restrictions on like products and those on production 
processes . . . . The same result could be achieved by redefining ‘like product.’ If products 
using different processes were deemed to be unlike, trade restrictions could be applied to 
goods produced using environmentally unacceptable methods without changing the exist-
ing structure of GATT rules.”). 
90 Schoenbaum, supra note 61, at 289–90. 
91 See Veel, supra note 42, at 778. But see Charnovitz, supra note 47, at 63 (“Even today, a 
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92 GATT, art. XX. 
93 See Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 13, at 514. 
94 WTO Report, supra note 1, at 107. 
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under its exceptions.95 Although the WTO dispute settlement system 
has not yet addressed climate change mitigation, two exceptions may 
prove extremely relevant.96 
 Article XX(b) allows trade restrictions that are “necessary to pro-
tect human, animal or plant life or health,” and Article XX(g) allows 
trade restrictions “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with re-
strictions on domestic production or consumption.”97 Importantly, 
WTO case law suggests that the policy objective underlying these excep-
tions is not at issue; rather, it is the trade measure and how it relates to 
the policy objective that is examined under Article XX.98 Several au-
thors argue that Article XX(b) could cover policies aimed at reducing 
carbon emissions because of the possible adverse effects of global warm-
ing for humans, animals, and plants.99 Further, Article XX(g) could also 
cover such policies due to the conservation of the planet’s atmosphere 
and climate, as well as animal and plant species that may become extinct 
due to climate change.100 
                                                                                                                     
1. Article XX(g) Exception 
 Most commentators treat Article XX(g) as a less restrictive excep-
tion than Article XX(b).101 Article XX(g) requires that the policy ob-
jective is within the range of policies for the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources, and that the trade measure is “related to” this policy 
and is employed “in conjunction” with similar domestic restrictions.102 
Early GATT case law did not permit the application of Article XX(g) to 
extraterritorial measures, reasoning that such an interpretation would 
allow “each contracting party [to] unilaterally determine the conserva-
 
95 See Wofford, supra note 76, at 567–68, 572–73. 
96 See WTO Report, supra note 1, at 107 (noting that XX(b) and XX(g) are the rele-
vant environmental exceptions). 
97 GATT, art. XX(b), (g). 
98 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, at 29–30 (Apr. 29, 1996) (96–1597) [hereinafter Gasoline Appel-
late Body Report]. 
99 WTO Report, supra note 1, at 108 (discussing attempts to fit climate change under 
XX(b) or XX(g) in the literature). 
100 Id. 
101 See Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 
143, 177 (2005); Jacob Werksman, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the WTO, 8 Rev. 
European Cmty. & Int’l Envtl. L. 251, 260 (1999). 
102 See GATT art. XX(b). 
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tion policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate 
without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement.”103 
 More recent WTO case law reveals that Article XX(g) is not lim-
ited to purely domestic conservation efforts.104 Additionally, the “con-
servation of exhaustible resources” is not limited to non-living stock 
resources (such as minerals), which is likely how the phrase was inter-
preted when the GATT was adopted.105 In United States—Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline), the Panel found that 
clean air was an exhaustible natural resource because, even though it 
was renewable, it could be depleted.106 Further, in United States—Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp/Turtle), the Ap-
pellate Body found that migratory sea turtles were an exhaustible natu-
ral resource because conservation was not limited to non-living re-
sources.107 The panel reasoned that the term “‘exhaustible natural 
resources’ . . . must be read by a treaty interpreter in light of contem-
porary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
conservation of the environment” and that the term is “not static in its 
content or reference but is rather ‘by definition, evolutionary.’”108 
 In recent WTO case law, the second requirement under XX(g)—
“related to”—has been interpreted as a “substantial relationship” be-
tween the policy objective and the trade restriction.109 Although in 
United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin II), the panel 
reasoned that an import ban on tuna was not “related to” the conserva-
tion of dolphins because the Article XX exceptions were to be inter-
preted narrowly,110 this interpretation has been relaxed in recent juris-
prudence.111 For example, in Shrimp/Turtle, the Appellate Body found 
that trade measures prohibiting the importation of shrimp caught in 
                                                                                                                      
103 Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, para. 5.32, DS21/R (Aug. 
1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155, 200 (1993). 
104 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, paras. 120–21, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp/Tur- 
tle Appellate Body Report]; Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
para. 5.16, DS29/R ( June 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839, 891 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II 
Panel Report]. 
105 See Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, J. 
World Trade, Oct. 1991, at 37, 46–47. 
106 Report of the Panel, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, WT/DS32/R, para. 6.37 ( Jan. 29, 1996) (96–0236) [hereinafter Gasoline Panel Re-
port]. 
107 Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 104, at paras. 131–33. 
108 Id. at paras. 129–30. 
109 WTO Report, supra note 1, at 108. 
110 See Tuna/Dolphin II Panel Report, supra note 104, at para. 5.26. 
111 See Wofford, supra note 76, at 577–80. 
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ways inimical to migratory sea turtle populations were “related to” sea 
turtle conservation.112 Additionally, the requirement that any trade re-
striction be “in conjunction with” domestic restrictions only requires 
“even-handedness.”113 
 The case for carbon tariffs under Article XX(g) usually begins with 
an analogy to the clean air argument from Gasoline.114 Because the 
panel found that “clean air” was an exhaustible natural resource, it is 
likely to find that the atmosphere’s greenhouse gas concentration is 
also an exhaustible natural resource.115 Additionally, the panel might 
find that “cool air” is a natural resource,116 or that the relevant natural 
resource involves the “potentially damaging environmental conditions 
that may arise [in a warmer world] such as impact on biodiversity and 
ecosystems.”117 In all these cases, the characterization of climate mitiga-
tion as conservation of a natural resource is admittedly attenuated.118 
Given the recent interpretation of the term “conservation” as contex-
tual and evolutionary,119 however, some suggest that climate change 
mitigation could be considered within the range of conservation ef-
forts.120 
 If WTO jurisprudence characterizes mitigating climate change as 
conservation, the next step is to determine whether a carbon tariff is 
“related to” climate change mitigation, and is imposed in conjunction 
with similar domestic restrictions.121 Although climate change is not 
confined to the EU, carbon tariffs may bear a substantial relationship to 
climate change, as shrimp import restrictions did to the conservation of 
migratory sea turtles.122 Further, because proposed carbon tariffs are a 
direct response to the EU’s domestic ETS regime, it is quite likely that 
the trade measures would satisfy the even-handedness requirement.123 
This leads one scholar to conclude that carbon tariffs would easily sat-
isfy Article XX(g)’s three-part analysis.124 
                                                                                                                      
112 Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 104, at paras. 141–42. 
113 See Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 98, at 20–21. 
114 See Veel, supra note 42, at 776. 
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116 See Green, supra note 101, at 183. 
117 See id. 
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119 See Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 104, at paras. 129–30. 
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122 See Veel, supra note 42, at 777. 
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2011] International Legality of Carbon Tariffs in the EU 213 
2. Article XX(b) Exception 
 Article XX(b) is a stricter exception than Article XX(g) because 
the former requires a necessary connection between the challenged 
trade restriction and the protection of human, animal, or plant life or 
health.125 Case law establishes that the term “necessary” does not mean 
“indispensable,” but it is stricter than “making a contribution to.”126 In 
earlier GATT case law, such as Tuna/Shrimp II, panels found that there 
could be no necessary connection if a policy was only effective where it 
“force[d] other countries to change their policies.”127 Recent case law 
presents a less restrictive interpretation, where “necessary” includes a 
balancing of factors and requires a “genuine relationship of ends and 
means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue.”128 In 
Asbestos, the Appellate Body further suggested that vital policy objectives 
would more easily satisfy the test for “necessity” compared to non-vital 
policy objectives.129 In Asbestos, the policy objective was “the preserva-
tion of human life and health” from hazardous asbestos, a vital policy 
objective weighing heavily in favor of finding a “necessary” connec-
tion.130 
 When the GATT was adopted in 1947, the “protection of human, 
animal and plant life or health” was probably limited to sanitary issues, 
but is no longer characterized in this limited manner.131 In Gasoline, the 
Panel found that reducing air pollution was a policy objective aimed at 
protecting life or health.132 Most recently, in Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Retreaded Tyres), the Appellate Body found that 
retreaded tire imports contributed significantly to tire waste that posed 
a risk of fire and mosquito-borne disease,133 and an import ban thus 
                                                                                                                      
125 See Green, supra note 101, at 177. 
126 See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Fro-
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served the policy objective of protecting life or health.134 In fact, the 
Appellate Body even briefly addressed climate change: 
We recognize that certain . . . environmental problems may be 
tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising a multi-
plicity of interacting measures. . . . Moreover, the results ob-
tained from certain actions—for instance, measures adopted in 
order to attenuate global warming and climate change . . . can only 
be evaluated with the benefit of time.135 
In addition to mentioning climate change mitigation, the Appellate 
Body emphasized the importance of understanding the relationship 
between a trade measure and the protection of life or health against 
the broader context of a comprehensive strategy.136 This seems to sug-
gest a liberalization of the once stringent exception.137 
 Establishing that climate change mitigation involves the protection 
of life and health is often viewed as plausible.138 Carbon emissions are 
deemed analogous to the relatively non-specific environmental damage 
in the most recent Article XX(b) case, Retreaded Tyres.139 Authors point 
to the potential damage that may result from increased global tempera-
tures, such as: increased death rates among the very young, old, and 
sick; increased tropical diseases; increased air and water-borne para-
sites; loss of habitation due to rising sea levels; and even various adverse 
effects on trees and forests.140 These potential damages suggest that 
climate change mitigation involves the protection of life or health, 
broadly construed.141 
 If WTO jurisprudence characterizes climate change mitigation as 
the protection of life or health, the next step is to determine whether a 
carbon tariff is “necessary” to this objective.142 Commentators tend to 
view this second prong of Article XX(b) as the more difficult obsta-
cle.143 Because Article XX(b) has a narrower scope than Article XX(g), 
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commentators seem concerned that the somewhat attenuated connec-
tions between climate change and carbon tariffs will not hold up to 
stricter scrutiny under Article XX(b).144 Still, in Retreaded Tyres, the Ap-
pellate Body emphasized the need to view trade measures against the 
context of a comprehensive regulatory strategy, and suggested that as 
long as the measure makes a serious contribution to this strategy, it 
could be deemed “necessary” under Article XX(b).145 This provides 
some commentators with hope that Article XX(b) may provide an al-
ternative justification for carbon tariffs.146 
 Many scholars see one or both Article XX exceptions as the key to 
providing for carbon tariffs under international trade law.147 Neverthe-
less, WTO jurisprudence has evolved to the point where the most chal-
lenging obstacle for environmental trade restrictions in the Article XX 
analysis lies in its preamble.148 
C. Article XX Chapeau 
 Even if carbon tariffs fit into one of the exceptions discussed 
above, they must still survive the prefatory chapeau to Article XX.149 
Indeed, the chapeau has evolved into the filter through which other-
wise acceptable trade restrictions cannot pass.150 The chapeau states 
that trade measures must not represent a means of unjustifiable or arbi-
trary discrimination, and must not represent a disguised restriction on 
international trade.151 As the Appellate Body stated in Gasoline, the 
purpose of the chapeau is to prevent “abuse of the exceptions.”152 The 
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chapeau represents the requirement that any exception be made in 
“good faith.”153 
 In all recent cases where the Appellate Body found that Article XX 
was not satisfied by environmental trade restrictions, the trade meas-
ures were provisionally justified under the substantive exceptions but 
did not satisfy the chapeau.154 In Gasoline, the Appellate Body found 
that trade restrictions related to gasoline standards that were provision-
ally justified as conservation of clear air nonetheless violated the cha-
peau.155 Specifically, the Appellate Body reasoned that the United 
States had not attempted to resolve its concerns through cooperation, 
and had discriminated between foreign and domestic firms for pur-
poses of alleviating costs to domestic firms.156 Similarly, in Shrimp/Turtle, 
the Appellate Body found that the United States’ prohibition on 
shrimp imports, though provisionally justified as conservation of sea 
turtles, was nonetheless an unjustifiable and arbitrary means of dis-
crimination under the chapeau.157 Specifically, the Appellate Body 
noted that the United States had failed to attempt serious negotiations 
before turning to unilateral measures, and that the trade restriction 
failed to take into account the different situations which may exist in 
exporting countries.158 Most recently, in Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate 
Body again found that trade measures that were provisionally justified 
as the protection of life or health, nonetheless violated the chapeau.159 
Brazil had allowed some imports of used tires through court injunc-
tions, which the Appellate Body found inconsistent with the policy ob-
jective, demonstrating arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.160 
 With an ever more liberal interpretation of the Article XX substan-
tive exceptions,161 the crux of the Article XX analysis has shifted to the 
chapeau, such that carbon tariffs appear to face a greater challenge 
from the chapeau than from the Article XX(b) and XX(g) exceptions 
themselves.162 In other words, as long as carbon tariffs are designed 
such that the chapeau is satisfied, they will most likely be legal under 
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international trade law.163 This shifts the focus to the design of carbon 
tariffs, rather than the legal (conceptual) permissibility of such trade 
measures.164 
 Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to begin designing the most 
chapeau-friendly carbon tariff under the assumption that the overarch-
ing legal question is so easily answered. Although GATT jurisprudence 
has evolved to encompass ever more environmental issues under its 
Article XX exceptions, climate change is a global externality and thus 
presents a wholly novel issue for Article XX analysis.165 
III. Analysis 
 Unilateral extraterritorial trade restrictions pose a special challenge 
in the context of international trade law.166 Justification for such envi-
ronmental trade restrictions can either involve leveling the playing field 
with respect to domestic measures or can involve trade measures em-
ployed for non-trade goals.167 This distinction mirrors that between Ar-
ticle III’s purpose (achieving commercial parity) and Article XX’s pur-
pose (allowing certain trade restrictions otherwise illegal under 
GATT).168 When trade measures are aimed at preserving commercial 
parity between domestic and foreign industries, Article III provides for 
border tax adjustments to level the playing field.169 But for environ-
mental trade measures that violate Article III, such as carbon tariffs,170 
Article XX is the only remaining justification.171 Although Article XX 
may be employed for extrajurisdictional trade restrictions targeting 
cosmopolitan objectives like the environment,172 Article XX should not 
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apply when the policy objective is to level the playing field.173 Thus, re-
ducing carbon emissions and preventing carbon leakage are relevant for 
purposes of the Article XX analysis, whereas leveling the playing field 
between EU and non-EU energy-intensive industries is not relevant.174 
 If the policy behind carbon tariffs in the EU is in fact commercial 
parity, which seems likely, the measures should be assessed under Arti-
cle III and not Article XX.175 But importantly, carbon tariffs should not 
fail the Article XX analysis merely because the policy objective is unrea-
sonable under the chapeau; rather, carbon tariffs should not even be 
provisionally justified under the substantive exceptions of Article XX. 
A. Chapeau Shift 
 The evolution of GATT jurisprudence since the WTO’s creation 
displays a larger emphasis on the prefatory chapeau compared to the 
substantive exceptions themselves.176 Most commentators see this evo-
lution as an enlightened response to rigid, poorly reasoned GATT deci-
sions such as the Tuna/Dolphin cases.177 In addition to a change in the 
structure of the analysis, such that the chapeau is applied only after 
provisional justification vis-à-vis the exceptions, the jurisprudence has 
also rejected the categorical exclusion of unilateral extraterritorial 
measures.178 Indeed, as many authors point out, such categorical exclu-
sion renders Article XX nugatory because the point of the exceptions is 
to allow unilateral action for international trade measures that would 
otherwise violate GATT.179 Nevertheless, the broad interpretation of 
the substantive exceptions may lead to the opposite problem, render-
ing the exceptions themselves nugatory.180 Some authors suggest that 
the purpose of GATT is strictly limited to eradicating protectionism,181 
and therefore Article XX should only require that the importing coun-
try is not blatantly externalizing domestic costs through its unilateral, 
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Law and International Environmental Law: Prevention and Settlement in International Environ-
mental Disputes in GATT, J. World Trade, Feb. 1993, at 42, 72. 
174 See Charnovitz, supra note 47, at 106. 
175 See id. 
176 See supra text accompanying notes154–64. 
177 See Wofford, supra note 76, at 579 n.105. 
178 See  Tuna/Dolphin II Panel Report, supra note 104, at para. 5.16. 
179 See Jinnah, supra note 20, at 737. 
180 Cf. Pauwelyn, supra note 67, at 37 (arguing that measures have been provisionally 
justified under Article XX in every recent WTO case). 
181 See, e.g, Charnovitz, supra note 41, at 485–86. 
2011] International Legality of Carbon Tariffs in the EU 219 
extraterritorial action.182 Yet this perspective seems to imply that the 
substance of the exceptions poses virtually no separate limitation for 
the design of border measures.183 
                                                                                                                     
 As mentioned above, carbon tariffs in the EU would probably fall 
short of Article XX justification in any event.184 But the “chapeau shift” 
remains quite significant within the context of carbon tariffs, even if the 
practical implications are not dramatic in the immediate future.185 Cli-
mate change mitigation—no matter how important—does represent 
the most archetypal global negative externality to be assessed under 
Article XX.186 As such, the presumption that carbon tariffs aimed at 
mitigating climate change will satisfy the ever broadening interpreta-
tion of the substantive exceptions themselves, only to fail the chapeau, 
is problematic. Namely, it represents a shift from assessing the trade 
measures themselves to examining only the reasonableness of their ap-
plication.187 But clearly this cannot be right, as the two prongs of the 
analysis are separate,188 and the analysis of the policy and its connec-
tion to the trade restriction in question cannot be collapsed into the 
chapeau’s analysis of whether the trade restriction is reasonable and 
not protectionist in nature.189 Although the consensus appears to be 
that carbon tariffs would be provisionally justified under the Article XX 
exceptions,190 this consensus is no replacement for substantive analysis, 
and such analysis is needed before assessing the reasonableness of car-
bon tariffs under the chapeau.191 
 
182 See Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 13, at 534. 
183 See Charnovitz, supra note 41, at 485–86. 
184 See supra text accompanying notes 170–72. 
185 Cf. Veel, supra note 42, at 798 (arguing that as long as carbon tariffs are applied rea-
sonably under the chapeau, they will comply with GATT). 
186 Cf. Stern Review, supra note 2, at 27 (implying that compared to all other negative 
externalities, climate change is the most significant “market failure”). 
187 See Vanes, supra note 161, at 278. 
188 See  Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 104, at para. 149. 
189 Cf. Charnovitz, supra note 41, at 485 (arguing that the GATT’s limited role is to de-
termine whether trade measures constitute protectionism). 
190 See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 67, at 37. 
191 Cf. Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 104, at para. 149 (noting that 
the two steps in the Article XX analysis are separate). 
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B. Reassessing Substantive Exceptions for Climate Change 
 As an archetypal global negative externality,192 climate change 
clearly presents a novel situation for Article XX application, despite the 
liberalization of WTO jurisprudence in recent years.193 The categorical 
ban of unilateral extraterritorial measures envisaged by the Panel in 
Tuna/Dolphin I and the categorical permission implied by recent envi-
ronmentalists are equally misplaced.194 Clearly, unilateral extraterrito-
rial measures can be provisionally justified under the Article XX excep-
tions, but they need not be.195 The question is how to assess which 
measures should fit into the exceptions, without relying upon a cate-
gorical approach (either exclusionary or inclusionary).196 Although a 
balancing approach that considers proportionality may appear the ob-
vious solution,197 there are considerable difficulties involved in assess-
ing the value of the policy objective of such extraterritorial measures.198 
Namely, such values are incommensurate and change country-to-
country, so there is no way to objectively weigh them.199 Moreover, the 
WTO dispute settlement bodies are ill-equipped to judge domestic pol-
icies and weigh the costs and benefits of such policies when applied 
unilaterally and extraterritorially.200 
 If categorical approaches are unwise, and a balancing approach is 
unworkable, Articles XX(b) and XX(g) would appear to pose intracta-
ble interpretive challenges.201 This causes some authors to reiterate that 
Article XX should be viewed simply as a mechanism for assessing the 
reasonableness of the relationship between the trade restriction and its 
policy objective.202 But again, this only focuses on the chapeau and ig-
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nores the independent nature of the substantive exceptions.203 Instead, 
it is worth considering that the relevant jurisprudence may not necessi-
tate the radical broadening of the environmental policies covered un-
der the exceptions. Despite protestations to the contrary, the Appellate 
Body does sometimes assess the legitimacy of policy objectives.204 Al-
though it pays significant deference to a Member Country to create its 
own domestic policies, the Appellate Body does not shy away from as-
sessing whether a policy fits under the enumerated exceptions.205 In 
fact, it is only under the presumption that such measures should apply 
to climate change mitigation—due to the importance of climate 
change mitigation coupled with the assumption that Article XX is a 
broad “environmental charter”—that it is at all convincing that they 
actually do.206 
 Put plainly, the analogies to climate change mitigation under Arti-
cles XX(b) and XX(g) are weak.207 The relevant cases under Article 
XX(b) involved the removal of hazardous asbestos in Asbestos,208 the 
reduction of air pollution in Gasoline,209 and the health hazards of tire 
waste in Retreaded Tyres.210 Although scholars seem to imagine a clear 
connection between climate change mitigation and the “protection of 
life or health,”211 climate change mitigation is considerably distinct 
from these cases, each of which involved clear and direct health haz-
ards.212 Climate change mitigation simply does not pose a similar dis-
tinct health hazard, whatever its potential future implications may be.213 
Further, no Article XX(b) case to date has involved extraterritorial pol-
icies: they each involved domestic health hazards for which import re-
strictions were created.214 Early environmentalists even attacked Article 
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XX(b) for its narrowness and failure to cover environmental policies 
aimed at the global commons.215 Lastly, although the Appellate Body in 
Retreaded Tyres suggested that “climate change” might be justified under 
Article XX(b), it did not explain its reasoning beyond noting the gen-
eral direction of evolutionary interpretation in WTO jurisprudence.216 
 The relevant cases under Article XX(g) may pose even more at-
tenuated policy analogies than the cases under Article XX(b).217 Al-
though Shrimp/Turtle established that exhaustible natural resources 
could be transboundary,218 migratory sea turtles are clearly an ex-
haustible natural resource because the species has tangible value and 
can become extinct.219 Further, although Gasoline is the most obvious 
parallel to carbon tariffs in the EU, “clean air” is also a clear exhaustible 
natural resource because clean air has value and can tangibly be de-
pleted by air pollution.220 But it is not at all obvious that current at-
mospheric carbon levels can be characterized as exhaustible (what is 
being depleted?) or even as resources (where is the tangible value?).221 
                                                                                                                     
 Additionally, were climate change mitigation deemed a legitimate 
policy objective under Article XX(b) or XX(g), the nexus between car-
bon tariffs in the EU and the policy objective is questionable. Although 
“necessary” and “related to” have been interpreted more liberally in 
recent jurisprudence,222 the relevant case law again evinces poor analo-
gies.223 Unlike those cases discussed above, the contribution that car-
bon tariffs would make to climate change mitigation remains quite un-
clear, in large part due to scientific uncertainty surrounding global 
warming.224 Commentators will often appeal to the “precautionary 
principle” to establish that a policy objective such as climate change 
mitigation should not be dismissed simply due to the lack of a clearly 
evidenced connection between a policy and a trade measure.225 Al-
though categorical dismissal based on uncertainty would thus be un-
warranted, this uncertainty may still pose challenges to forging a suffi-
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cient nexus.226 Moreover, for the very reason that carbon tariffs may fail 
the chapeau— that the measures are too intimately related to “leveling 
the playing field” and not to carbon leakage—they should probably not 
survive the “sufficient nexus” tests under the substantive exceptions 
either.227 Notably, there is scant evidence regarding the specific effects 
that such trade measures would have on carbon leakage or reductions 
in atmospheric carbon content.228 As long as more than subjective in-
tent is required for the nexus between trade measures and policy objec-
tives, carbon tariffs will face problems.229 
 Although it is unclear what the Appellate Body would actually do if 
faced with carbon tariffs in the EU, these trade measures pose a novel 
issue that is not easily resolved by examining recent jurisprudence or 
paying lip service to the “enlightened liberalization” of WTO jurispru-
dence in recent years.230 In fact, carbon tariffs are precisely the kind of 
trade measure—aimed explicitly at a global negative externality with 
limited connection to any particular jurisdiction231—that demonstrates 
the importance of breathing life back into the substantive exceptions of 
Article XX.232 The “chapeau shift” implies that any environmental 
trade restrictions otherwise violating GATT may be justified under the 
Article XX exceptions, so long as the application of the restriction satis-
fies the reasonableness test of the chapeau.233 But this cannot be right, 
because Article XX does not cover every possible environmental re-
striction: it is not the “environmentalist charter” that some imagine it to 
be.234 Indeed, the word “environment” does not even appear in Article 
XX.235 As environmentalists argued before the advent of expansive 
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WTO jurisprudence, Article XX is too narrow for environmental issues 
such as “the atmosphere and other elements of the global commons,” 
and to deal with such issues GATT should be amended or replaced.236 
Interestingly, this Note reaches a similar conclusion. The substance of 
Article XX should not be interpreted so broadly as to cover carbon tar-
iffs, and if this is viewed as dissatisfactory in light of the growing signifi-
cance of climate change, WTO members should propose an amend-
ment to Article XX.237 
                                                                                                                     
Conclusion 
 The EU emissions trading system represents the largest domestic 
program addressing climate change—a significant achievement. Unfor-
tunately, in a world with few similar programs, the EU’s progressive ap-
proach places its energy-intensive industries at a competitive disadvan-
tage. As a result, some EU members have proposed carbon border taxes 
to level the playing field. The analysis for WTO-compliance of these car-
bon tariffs consists of several steps. The first step is to determine wheth-
er the border measure is in fact an “internal tax” for purposes of Articles 
II and III, and, if so, whether it is an indirect rather than a direct tax. If 
characterized as an indirect internal tax, the tax imposed on foreign 
products must not exceed taxes on “like domestic products.” If the bor-
der tax does not comply with Article III of GATT, it may be saved by the 
Article XX exceptions, which involve both a substantive analysis of 
whether an exception applies provisionally, as well as an analysis of 
whether the measure complies with the prefatory chapeau. At present, 
the consensus is that carbon border taxes would likely fail to comply 
with Article III, but succeed in satisfying one or both relevant exceptions 
when liberally construed, and that the most important question is thus 
whether a carbon tariff would satisfy the chapeau—largely a question of 
practical design. 
 Nevertheless, this Note suggests that for the unique policy of cli-
mate change mitigation, this general consensus is misplaced. Rather, 
the Article XX exceptions should be construed to pose a significant 
obstacle to carbon tariffs, such as those proposed for the EU. Accord-
ingly, carbon tariffs in the EU should fail, not because their application 
would be unreasonable, but because Article XX probably does not 
permit trade restrictions related to climate change mitigation. If true, 
WTO Members intent on unilaterally addressing climate change should 
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propose an amendment to GATT Article XX to explicitly allow such 
measures under international trade law. 
